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1 September 1960

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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03184166 1 SEPTEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC East Germany's claim to control over access to Berlin intended to (a) establish precedent based on East German "sovereignty" and (b) foment differences among East Germany gains de facto recognition from Indonesia and Burma. ② North Korea receives first diplomatic recognition outside bloc as Cuba agrees to exchange embassies. 3 Increasing signs that Khrushchev and satellite leaders will attend UNGA. 4 II. ASIA-AFRICA Jordan--King to warn that further subversive acts will bring war with UAR. (3) 0 The situation in the Congo. LATE ITEMS Ŧ The situation in Laos. Iran--Nationalists may demonstrate in

Allies.

Tehran today.

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East Germany: Although the threat to Berlin access contained in the East German governmental declaration of 30 August and the accompanying Ministry of Interior decree was apparently designed to underline the power of the Ulbricht regime to impose sudden and arbitrary controls over access to the city, there has been no substantial interference yet with travel between West Germany and West Berlin. Increased control is being exercised over West Germans going to East Berlin, however,

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the Ulbricht regime has instituted a new campaign to discourage East Germans and East Berliners from going to West Berlin. By these sudden moves, Ulbricht probably hopes to create a state of anxiety among the Allies and in West Berlin with a view to fomenting differences in the West. Thus far the East German moves do not indicate an intention to block Western military traffic to the city. Harassment of Allied ground and perhaps commercial air traffic is possible, however, and harassment of West German civilian traffic to and from West Berlin remains likely.

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East Germany: East Germany has scored successes in its campaign for de facto recognition in the non-Communist world by inducing Indonesia and Burma to follow the example of the UAR in agreeing to an exchange of consuls general with the Ulbricht regime. East Germany will probably increase its efforts to persuade India and the new African states to follow suit, as a step toward eventual diplomatic recognition. Unless Indonesia and Burma do establish formal diplomatic ties with East Germany, Bonn is not expected to view the consular agreements as making it necessary to decide on whether to sever relations.

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North Korea - Cuba: North Korea has received its first diplomatic recognition outside the bloc with the 29 August agreement to exchange ambassadors with Cuba "as soon as possible." Cuba has little to gain economically from North Korea, but establishment of relations at this time is consistent with the increasingly close ties between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc and probably foreshadows establishment of relations between Cuba and Communist China. Pyongyang will probably publicize this development to show that Western opposition to the North Korean regime need not be a barrier to recognition. (Page 3)

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Bloc-UN: There are increasing signs that Khrushchev and satellite leaders will attend the opening of the forthcoming UN General Assembly session on 20 September. Khrushchev may use his short visit to Finland as the occasion to appeal to world leaders to attend the General Assembly discussion, announce his intention to attend the meeting, and hint at some new initiative on disarmament.

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

intends to notify both the UN and the Arab League that
Jordan will immediately declare war against the UAR if any further subversive acts "inspired or sponsored" by the UAR against Jordan should occur in the future. The King has accused the UAR of "direct complicity" in the bombing assassination of Prime Minister Majalli and ten others on 29 August. A roundup of suspects is under way in Jordan, and tougher internal security measures are likely. Jordanian military forces were placed in a "state of emergency" immediately following the assassination, and the UAR has strengthened its defenses on the border between Jordan and Syria,

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Congo: The Katanga government anticipates an imminent invasion by the Congolese Army units of Premier Lumumba and is making defensive preparations along the frontier with Kasai. President Tshombe on 30 August threatened to put the base at Kamina out of action unless Katanga's sovereignty over the base is respected and the UN guarantees that Lumumba's troops will be barred from landing there.

The USSR's prestige in the Congo will be enhanced by the arrival of twelve IL-14s which reportedly are carrying food supplies to the Congo. At Stanleyville a Soviet "medical" mission was disembarked on 24 August,

a similarly labeled mission has arrived in Luluabourg, where it is setting up a radio net.

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### III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
  - NOTE: There have been no new developments with respect to West Berlin which would require a change in the conclusions of the special Watch Committee meeting of 30 August.

C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:

The new Souvanna Phouma cabinet, comprising supporters of both General Phoumi and Souvanna, appears to be acceptable to Lao officials other than Kong Le. The new Laotian Government will probably adopt neutralist policies which would afford opportunities for increased Communist presence in Laos.

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Kong Le's political isolation may cause him to seek an alliance with the Pathet Lao and thus pose a political and military threat to the stability of the country.

### LATE ITEMS

\*Situation in Laos as of 0230 EDT: In a sudden about face Captain Kong Le is reported to have dropped his opposition to the compromise government put together in Luang Prabang by premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi. If true, this would appear to remove the last major stumbling block to the restoration of constitutional order in Laos. An atmosphere of distrust prevails however. After Kong Le's initial rejection of the government on 31 August on the grounds that Phoumi and other members of the ousted Somsanith government would "try to seize power again and will resume civil war," Phoumi returned to his base at Savannakhet but agreed to come back to Luang Prabang on 1 September if Souvanna Phouma won Kong Le's cooperation.

Souvanna, who flew to Vientiane on 31 August immediately after the national assembly voted confidence in his government, has issued an invitation over Vientiane radio for the Communist Pathet Lao to send representatives to Vientiane where he believed 'outstanding problems can be settled within a few days.' Presumably Souvanna made this gesture to convince Kong Le that the aims of his coup would be incorporated into the policies of the new government. He may also have made other concessions to secure Kong's cooperation which could ultimately prove unacceptable to Phoumi and other anti-Communists in the new government.

\*Iran: Nationalist and anti-government elements in Tehran, apparently encouraged by the Shah's 27 August statement criticizing irregularities in the recent parliamentary elections, reportedly have scheduled a major demonstration in the capital on

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1 September. Allahyar Saleh, leader of the Iran Party and former associate of ex-Premier Mossadeq who has aroused considerable popular enthusiasm with his criticism of the elections, may come to Tehran from the provincial city of Kashan in conjunction with the demonstration. The government is probably aware of the nationalists' plans and may initiate action to prevent the demonstration. Should this not deter the nationalists, serious clashes with the security forces could occur.

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### East Germans Intensify Pressure on West Berlin

The East German Government's declaration of 30 August and the accompanying decree issued by the Ministry of Interior are designed to underline the power of the Ulbricht regime to impose sudden and arbitrary controls on access to West Berlin and to point up the inability of the Western powers to counter such moves. The language of the East German declaration was deliberately vague, apparently to allow considerable flexibility in the actual implementation of the threats between 31 August and 4 September.

The new campaign reportedly is also intended to be a dress rehearsal of measures to be instituted in the event Bonn decides to hold a meeting of the West German parliament in West Berlin later this year. As a pretext for their current actions, the East Germans seized upon two mass meetings scheduled to be held in West Berlin the end of this week by West German refugee and expellee organizations.

Immediately following its announcement, the regime strengthened police reserves on the border between East and West Berlin with a view to halting travel by West Germans to East Berlin and intensified security checks on the S-Bahn (elevated railway) between East and West Berlin. As yet, there has been little interference with travel between West Germany and West Berlin; efforts may be made, however, to prevent delegates to the meetings of refugee organizations from crossing the zonal borders.

| 1 |  |  | the Socialist         |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|-----------------------|--|--|--|
|   | Unity party (SED) politburo held a joint meeting with the East |  |                       |  |  |  |
|   | German Government on 30 August.                                |  |                       |  |  |  |
|   |  | the regime has decided   | d to institute a much |  |  |  |
| 1 | str  | stronger policy on Berlin, as a result of alleged provocations |                       |  |  |  |
|   |  | y "militarists and revanchists." The most serious provoca-     |                       |  |  |  |
|   |  | on probably was the visit of West Berlin                       |                       |  |  |  |
|   |  | n 25 August to East Berlinwhere he rec                         |                       |  |  |  |
|   |  | rikas d <b>i Aro</b> k   |                       |  |  |  |

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welcome from East Berliners. The regime has asserted it intends to make every effort to deter such "provocative" visits by banning the use of Berlin's access routes, including the air corridors. Although there was no plan to seal off Berlin, extremely strict controls were to be imposed and special control measures reportedly were being worked out for the S-Bahn.

one major purpose of this campaign is to deter visits by East Germans and East Berliners to West Berlin--a move to slow the steadily rising flow of refugees. On 30 August Potsdam District ordered all party activists to be mobilized for an all-out agitation campaign to be conducted in all railroad stations, enterprises, villages, and housing centers to convince every citizen that he should stay home during the five-day period. In particular, "border crossers" who work in West Berlin were to be "convinced" that they should stay away from their jobs during the crucial period. Special entertainment was to be provided to keep the populace--particularly youths--from going to the Western sectors. However, the next day SED headquarters in Neubrandenburg warned party, police, and security officials not to disturb "the normal life of the populace in any way" -- suggesting that the regime greatly fears a recurrence of the anxiety that swept through East Germany following the breakup of the summit meeting. However, this would not deter the regime from attempting to interfere with or prevent the meetings in West Berlin.

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### North Korea and Cuba to Establish Diplomatic Relations

North Korea has received its first diplomatic recognition outside the bloc with the 29 August agreement to exchange ambassadors with Cuba "as soon as possible." The announcement was made in a joint declaration issued in Havana after Cuba's acting Foreign Minister Cepero Bonilla and North Korean Finance Minister Han Sang-tu had signed a cultural exchange agreement.

Before this agreement with Havana, Pyongyang had been conspicuously unsuccessful in its efforts to gain recognition from non-Communist countries, although it did manage to make a few trade and cultural contacts. Now it will make every effort to flaunt its first nonbloc embassy in efforts to convince neutral nations they too can ignore Western opposition and accept the Pyongyang regime as a member of the international community.

Havana's action is consistent with the increasingly close ties being developed between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc and may foreshadow recognition of Peiping, with which Cuba concluded a trade pact in July. Communist China has displayed particular sympathy for the Cuban revolution, and Chou En-lai on 15 August pledged the Cuban people "every possible aid, with no strings attached," in their anti-US "struggle."

Fidel Castro, in his recent public attacks on the United States, has repeatedly declared Cuba's intention "to be the friend of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic because they have proved to be our friends." On 30 August, he condemned "US intervention everywhere in the world-in Korea, Taiwan, Indochina, and everywhere else...defending the Chiang Kai-shek puppet."

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### Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03184166 King Husayn I ands to Deliver Ultimatum Reg Subversive Activities

King Husayn

intends to notify the UN and the Arab League that Jordan will immediately declare war on the UAR if it inspires or sponsors any further subversive acts against Jordan. The King has accused the UAR of direct complicity in the assassination of Prime Minister Majalli and ten others on 29 August. He believes the UAR's ultimate aim is to see Husayn himself assassinated. Cairo's Voice of the Arabs' broadcasts in recent months have included thinly veiled incitations to assassinate Jordanian leaders. Since Majalli's demise, the station has claimed the event is "proof" that Jordan's "agents of imperialism" can no longer hold their positions. Amman radio claims that "Damascus now shelters. . . the murderers." )

The King, however, does not appear about to take any hasty or ill-considered counteraction. He has said the only action Jordan is taking for the moment vis-a-vis the UAR is to ask for the extradition of two Jordanians suspected of having set the time bombs before crossing the border into Syria. An alleged accomplice arrested in Amman has reportedly confessed that the plot was conceived and supported by Syrian Minister of Interior Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, an Egyptian intelligence officer, and two Jordanian exiles in Syria ا

Jordanian military forces were placed in "a state of emergency" following the bombings, probably primarily in the interests of internal security. The composition of the new cabinet also suggests that the new government intends to maintain strong internal security controls. The UAR nevertheless has strengthened and alerted its Jordanian border defenses in Syria,

The Syrian Army commander, however, decided not to call up reserve forces, since "this would attract attention unnecessarily."

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The Katanga government of President Tshombe expects an early invasion by Congolese Army units of Premier Lumumba and is taking defensive military measures along 250 miles of frontier with Kasai Province. Bridges, roads, and railway connections have been destroyed to a depth of 12 miles from the frontier, and recruitment and troop training efforts stepped up. The fear of invasion has prompted Tshombe to press the UN for a firm commitment regarding the former Belgian base of Kamina, which is located in Katanga Province and contains one of the best airfields and supply depots in the Congo. In a communique on 30 August he threatened to put the base out of action-he might be able to cut off the base's 15,000-man labor supply-unless Katanga's sovereignty was "respected" at Kamina and the UN guaranteed that Lumumba's troops would be barred from landing there. Command has reinforced its strength at Kamina by sending Swedish troops to join an Irish unit.

On 31 August, when it was discovered that 400 paratroopers, 100 airfield guards, and a school of aviation still remained at Kamina, Secretary General Hammarskjold criticized Belgium for failing to live up to the evacuation terms. The UN had authorized several hundred technicians to remain, and Lumumba and Moscow radio have already condemned this action. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov delivered a strong protest to Hammarskjold against the continued presence of Belgian forces in the Congo.

In neighboring Kasai Province the situation remains confused, with officials of the secessionist "Mining State" claiming that Baluba tribesmen have recaptured their capital of Bakwanga from Lumumba's troops.

| The USSR's prestige in the Congo will be endinent arrival of twelve IL-14s carrying foodst may remain in the Congo to be used in behalf of to consolidate his power throughout the country that the USSR will permit them to become involitary operations against Katanga forces. viet "medical" mission-apparently part of the rived in Leopoldville in mid-August-disembar on 24 August, with a similar label arrived in Luluabourg and net. | Luffs. The planes Lumumba's efforts , but it is doubtful ved directly in mil- A So- group which ar- ked at Stanleyville and another group |
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